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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 










BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a. decision of the State Tax 
Commission. The question present is whether or not the 
plaintiff, Barrett Investment Company, is liable for a 
Utah use tax on out-of-state purchases of airplane parts 
and parts for a ski lift. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION 
After consideration of the facts and the law, the Tax 
Commission cancelled part and sustained part of the 
deficiency assessment against Barrett Investment Com-
pany, in a decision dated February 18, 1963. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of that part of the Com-
mission's decision which sustained the deficiency 
assessment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Barrett Investment Company (hereinafter 
referred to as ''Barrett''), made a series of purchases 
during the period from June 1, 1958, to July 31, 1961, 
which may be categorized as follows (R. 45) : 
Category (a) : Purchases from Dallas Aero Service 
of airplane parts in the amount of $8,816.05. 
Category (b) : Purchases of parts for a ski lift 
from various out-of-state firms in the total amount of 
$50,163.70. 
Category (c): Purchase of a motor apparatus for 
ski lift from Graybar Electric Company in the amount 
of $42,812.00. 
Under date of August 2, 1962, the Auditing Division 
of the State Tax Commission prepared and issued a 
deficiency assessment against Barrett Investment Com-
pany in the amount of $2,747.35 (R. 26-37). This was 
based on the transactions listed above and included inter-
est to July 30, 1962; $2,443.01 was listed as due and 
owing to the State Tax Commission, the remainder to 
Salt Lake County under terms of the Utah local option 
use tax provided for in Title 11, Chapter 9, U.C.A. 1953. 
Plaintiff took objection to this assessment and filed a 
timely petition for redetermination of the same (R. 2-3). 
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This objection was based upon four grounds, two of which 
are not asserted by Barrett in this appeal. The third was 
accepted by the Commission in its decision. The objec-
tion still advanced read as follows : 
'' 1. That the purchases of the petitioner upon 
which a use tax is sought to be imposed 
are exempt from the use tax by reason of the 
provisions of 59-16-4, U.C.A. 1953. That the 
said purchases were of property, the gross 
receipts from the use of which are now subject 
to a sales tax under the laws of the State of 
Utah.'' 
This is a claim of exemption under 59-16-4( d). 
In addition, Barrett urges that he is entitled to 
exemption under provision of 59-16-4(h). This conten-
tion was not made before the Commission and is being 
here advanced for the first time. 
A hearing was held, at which Attorney Lee W. Hobbs 
presented the plaintiff's objections to the assessment. 
The Commission, in its decision (R. 45-47), upheld the 
deficiency assessment on the purchases in Category (a) 
and Category (b). Barrett's position as to the purchase 
in Category (c) was sustained, however, and that portion 
of the deficiency assessment ($856.25) based upon this 
purchase was dismissed. 
Plaintiff has never seriously contended that the tax 
is inappropriate as far as it applies to the transactions 
in Category (a), the purchase of airplane parts from 
Dallas Aero Service (R. 8-9). The items here involved 
were not made part of the ski lift (R. 7 -8). The brief of 
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plaintiff attacks the position of the Commission only on 
those items in Category (b). The argument in this 
brief will deal only with these purchases. 
The essential facts are not in dispute. The parties 
have stipulated that the items in Category (b) are com-
ponent parts of a ski lift at Brighton, Utah; that sales 
tax has been collected and remitted on admissions paid 
to ride the ski lift; and that neither a sales nor a use tax 
has been paid on any of the purchases here involved 
(R. 6-7). Findings of fact Nos. 3 and 4 in the Com-
mission's decision (R. 45) are based upon this stipula-
tion. The Court's attention is directed to a typographi-
cal error in finding 3 in the Record. The finding begins : 
''That the Barrett Investment Company con-
structed a ski lift out of parts purchased hereto-
fore described in 1 (a) and (b), ... '' 
This should read : 
That the Barrett Investment Company con-
structed a ski lift out of parts purchased hereto-
fore described in 1 (b) and (c). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRANSACTIONS HERE INVOLVED 
ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF AND SUB-




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The deficiency assessment in this case was made 
under provision of Title 59, Chapter 16, Sec. 3, U.C.A. 
1953, which provides as follows : 
''There is levied and imposed an excise tax on the 
storage, use or other consumption in this state of 
tangible personal property purchased for storage, 
use or other consumption in this state at the rate 
of 21;2% * of the sales price of such property. 
''Every person storing, using or otherwise con-
suming in this state tangible personal property 
purchased shall be liable for the tax imposed by 
this act, and the liability shall not be extinguished 
until the tax has been paid to this state.'' 
The Utah use tax is complementary to the sales tax, 
and broadens the excise tax base and makes the imposi-
tion of the sales tax more equitable. Union Portland Ce-
ment v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 135, 170 P. 2d 
164, modified 110 Utah 152, 176 P. 2d 879. 
The typical situation for the imposition of this tax 
is the situation in the instant case - property is pur-
chased out of state and brought into the state for use, 
storage or other consumption. 
Since the transactions meet the test of Section 
59-16-3, plaintiff is subject to the tax unless specifically 
exempted. Exemption is claimed under two subsections 
of 59-16-4, and Barrett's contentions will be dealt with 
in points 2 and 3 of this brief. 
*Since the transactions here involved, the rate has been changed 
to 3 per cent on a state-wide basis. However, the 2% per cent 
was in force during the period in which the disputed purchases 
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On pages 4 and 5 of plaintiff's brief, the correct rule 
of tax exemption construction is stated. Exemption stat-
utes are to be construed strictly against those seeking 
exemption, and the burden is on them to establish an affir-
mative case in favor of exemption. This rule has been 
articulated by a leading authority as follows: 
''As a general rule, grants of tax exemptions are 
given a rigid interpretation against the assertions 
of the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing power. 
The basis for the rule here is the same as that sup-
porting a rule of strict construction of positive 
revenue laws -that the burden of taxation should 
be distributed equally and fairly among the mem-
bers of society.'' Sutherland, Statutory Construc-
tion,. Vol. 3, Sec. 6702. 
The respected and venerable tax law treatise, 
Cooley on Taxa.tion, states the same principle in this 
manner: 
"An intention on the part of the legislature to 
grant an exemption from the taxing power of the 
state will never be implied from language which 
will admit of any other reasonable construction. 
Such an intention must be expressed in clear and 
unmistakable terms or must appear by necessary 
implication from the language used, for it is a 
well-settled principle that, when a special privi-
lege or exemption is claimed under a state, charter 
or act of ill-corporation, it is to be construed 
strictly against the property owner and in favor 
of the public. This principle applies with peculiar 
force to a claim of exemption fom taxation. Ex-
emptions are never presumed, the burden is on a 
claimant to establish clearly his right to exemp-
tion, and an alleged grant of exemption will be 
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strictly construed and cannot he made out by in-
ference or implication but must be beyond rea-
sonable doubt. In other words, since taxation is 
the rule, and exemption the exception, the inten-
tion to make an exemption ought to be expressed 
in clear and unambiguous terms ; it cannot be 
taken to have been intended when the language 
of the statute on which it depends is doubtful or 
uncertain; and the burden of establishing it is 
upon him who claims it. Moreover, if an exemp-
tion is found to exist, it must not be enlarged by 
construction, since the reasonable presumption is 
that the state has granted in express terms all it 
intended to grant at all, and that unless the privi-
lege is limited to the very terms of the statute the 
favor would be extended beyond what was 
meant. . . . '' Vol. 2, Sec. 672. 
We are fortunate in our jurisdiction to have two of 
the leading cases standing for this proposition of la,v, 
which is accepted in virtually every American jurisdic-
tion. The first, Judge v. Spencer, dealing with property 
tax, was decided in 1897. The Court said : 
'' ... the court will not aid or enlarge exemptions 
by interpretation. The presumption is that all 
exemptions intended to be granted were granted 
in express terms. In such cases the rule of strict 
construction applies, and, in order to relieve any 
species of property from its due and just propor-
tion of the burdens of the government, the lan-
guage relied on, as creating the exemption, should 
be so clear as not to admit of reasonable controver-
sy about its meaning, for all doubts must be re-
solved against the exemption. The power to tax 
rests upon necessity, and is essential to the state.'' 
15 Utah 242, 249; 48 Pac. 1097, 1099-1100. 
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The second is the case of Stillman v. Lynch ( 1920), 
56 Utah 540, 547; 192 Pac. 272, 275; 12 A.L.H. 552, 556. 
The Court held as follows : 
"If as to exemption there is doubt, that doubt will 
be resolved in favor of taxation. It has been said 
taxation is the rule, exemption the exception. '' 
This proposition was stated with particular cogency 
by the United States Supreme Court in Farrin.gton v. 
Tennessee, 94 U.S. 679, 24 L. Ed. 558, 560: 
"When exemption is claimed, it must be shown 
indubitably to exist. At the outset every presump-
tion is against it. A well-founded doubt is fatal to 
the claim. It is only when the claims of the con-
cession are too explicit to admit fairly of any other 
construction that the proposition can be sup-
ported." 
The equity and necessity behind this principle are 
familiar enough that they need not be belabored in any 
detail. Every exemption that excuses a person or an 
article of property or transaction from taxation throws 
a correspondingly greater burden on all other persons or 
articles of property or transactions actually taxed. 
Therefore, exemptions must, in the interest of fairness, 
be granted in only those situations where the legislature 
has determined that they are merited and specifically 
·expressed this determination, and in no others. Defend-
ant contends that the plaintiff in the instant case does not 
merit such an exemption, and will examine this conten-
tion in the remainder of this brief. 
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POINT II. 
THE PURCHASES HERE INVOLVED ARE 
NOT ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM 
UTAH USE TAX UNDER PROVISION OF 
SECTION 59-16-4(d), U.O.A. 1953. 
Use tax exemptions in this country fall into several 
rather easily definable classifications. One type exempts 
from taxation transactions involving certain categories of 
property. Another provides that certain persons or 
organizations be exempt from the tax, without regard to 
the inherent nature of the property involved. Still an-
other negates the tax on certain transactions because of 
certain characteristics of the transactions themselves, 
such as the fact that interstate commerce may be involved. 
The fourth category excuses imposition of the tax because 
the property involved in the transaction has been, or is 
about to he- either in its present or a modified form-
subjected to a sales or use tax as a part of the same 
transaction or series of transactions. 
Both of the exemption provisions under which Bar-
rett claims exemption in the instant case are of the last-
named type. The first relied upon, 59-16-4( d), provided, 
during the period in question, exemption for: 
"Property, the gross receipts from the sale, dis-
tribution or use of which are now subject to a sale 
or excise tax under the laws of this state or of 
some other state of the United States.'' 
This Court has interpreted this section as follows: 
''The clear intent of the legislature in passing sub-
section (d) was to prevent duplication of taxes and 
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discrimination against property which was 
already subject to a tax comparable to the US(' 
tax." Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 110 Utah 145,.170 Pac. 2d 169. 
Almost all states in which the use tax is in force have 
statutory provision for a similar exemption. The wording 
of the statutes vary considerably, but all create what is 
in substance the same exemption. If a sales or use tax 
has been paid, or is about to be paid, on the transaction 
in question or gross receipts from the sale, distribution 
or use of the property as part of this transaction or a 
closely related series of transactions, a use tax will 
not lie. 
The State Tax Commission has interpreted this sub-
section in a manner consistent with the Portland Cement 
holding. This interpretation is entitled to great weight 
in connection with those laws which it has the responsi-
bility to administer. Indeed, the Commission's interpre-
tation is presumably correct, and the Commission's rul-
ing should not be overturned unless clearly erroneous, or 
unless an abuse of the administrative discretion is pres-
ent. See Sutherland, Statutory Construction., Vol. 2, Sees. 
5103 and 5105; see also Western Leather & Finding Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 227, 48 P. 2d 526. 
The reference in the Union Portla.nd Cement case to 
"duplication of taxes" is revealing. The real intent of 
the legislature in enacting subsection (d) was the pre-
vention of duplicate taxation or of double taxation. Per-
haps this section would create exemption beyond the 
10 
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actual double taxation prohibition, but this is nonethe-
less the legislative motive in enacting the provision. 
The constitutional and equitable provision against 
double taxation is a prohibition against multiple taxa-
tion of the same type on the same transaction or occur-
rence. Thus, two sales taxes or a sales and use tax could 
not be imposed on the same purchase. But this does not 
mean the same property cannot be subjected to a series 
of taxes throughout its life. For instance, a person may 
purchase a valuable painting and pay a sales tax thereon. 
He may pay an ad valorem tax on it each year he owns it 
until his death, when it may he subjected to an inheritance 
tax. The heir may then sell it to a third party and another 
sales tax is imposed and the process starts all over again. 
This is only one example of many that could he given. 
Defendant submits that in this frame of reference it 
is clear that this prohibition is not being violated by the 
imposition of a use tax against Barrett. The purchase of 
ski lift parts and the taxing of admissions to the ski lift 
are not duplicate taxes upon one transaction or a series 
of transactions closely enough related to make taxa-
tion on both prohibitive. 
The question before this Court, as far as plaintiff 
is concerned, is not whether he be required to pay one 
tax or two taxes, but whether he is to pay one tax or 
no tax. The tax on admissions is paid by the skiers 
using the lift; Barrett's only function in relation thereto 
is as a collector and remitter. Barrett is the ultimate 
consumer of these parts, and it is not inequitable or 
11 
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discriminatory to require his paying an excise tax on the 
purchase thereof. 
The construction of this statute urged upon this 
Court by plaintiff, reduced to its barest essentials, is 
that the transfer of any property, on which an exeisl' 
tax would normally be appropriate, would not be subject 
to such excise tax if such property is used after purchase 
in any manner whatsoever that would bring any monies 
("gross receipts") to the user upon which an excise ta:s: 
1s paid. 
An acceptance of this construction would have far-
reaching consequences. A few examples will clarify this 
contention. Any theater purchasing chairs or projection 
equipment would not have to pay a sales or use tax on 
this equipment because the ''gross receipts'' of the use 
thereof, admission tickets, would be subject to a sales 
tax. Plates and silverware used in a restaurant would 
also he exempt, as would any equipment used in manu-
facturing or constructing any commodity on which a sales 
or use tax is appropriate. In an office, paper, pencils, 
ballpoint pens or similar items would be exempt if the 
company involved was manufacturing any product or per-
forming any service upon which an excise tax is paid. 
It could even be argued that any food consumed by a per-
son producing a taxable product or service to the public 
would be exempt from this tax, since the food would 
create energy, and the "gross receipt" from the "use" 
of this food as energy could contribute to the service or 
the commodity which he sells. This last illustration 
might be considered reductio ad absurdum, hut defendant 
12 
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submits that it follows logically and inevitably from 
plaintiff's interpretation of this section. 
An adoption of Barrett's interpretation could con-
ceivably result in the loss of hundreds of thousands of 
dollars of revenue yearly in this state, and would cer-
tainly precipitate a tortured reappraisal of the entire 
excise tax structure by legislative and administrative 
bodies involved in revenue administration in this state. 
The preceding catalog of impending disasters admit-
tedly may not in itself be convincing argument for defend-
ant's position, but can it conceivably be maintained that 
the Utah Legislature intended these things, which an 
adoption of plaintiff's interpretation of 59-16-4( d) would 
inevitably bring.J to come to pass~ We submit that it can-
not, and thus plaintiff's interpretation of the statute 
is erroneous. 
It is presumed in the preceding paragraphs that this 
use tax exemption, under an inverse application of the 
Portland Cement holding that all sales tax exemptions 
are also use tax exemptions, whether specifically stated 
to be so or not, 110 Utah 156, 157, 176 P. 2d 881, is also 
a sales tax exemption. The fact that there is no specific 
sales tax exemption which would approximate in scope 
and meaning 59-16-4( d) as interpreted by plaintiff, how-
ever, suggests in itself that this interpretation is erro-
neous, for there is no evidence that the legislature could 
have intended to grant special and sweeping discrimina-
tory concessions in the form of this type of exemption 
in use tax transactions and not in sales tax transactions. 
13 
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And Subsection 59-16-4(d) predates by over a decade 
the Union Portland Cement case. 
The Court's attention is directed to the word "now" 
in the statute. This indicates the point in time at which 
the exemption may lie, and it must be that point in time 
at which the use tax is first appropriate, at which the first 
storage, use or consumption of the property in Utah takes 
place. At that point in time in the instant case, there were 
no ''gross receipts'' of any ''use'' of any property here 
involved subject to an excise tax. Barrett's claim must 
then fail, even if (and this is, of course, disputed) his 
interpretation of other parts of the exemption provision 
is correct. 
POINT III. 
THE PURCHASES HERE INVOLVED ARE 
NOT ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROl\1 
UTAH USE TAX UNDER PROVISION OF 
SECTION 59-16-4(h), U.C.A. 1953. 
Plaintiff claims, in the alternative, exemption under 
59-16-4(h), which exempts the following: 
"Property which enters into and becomes an in-
gredient or component part of the property which 
a person engaged in the business of manufactur-
ing, compounding for sale, profit or use manufac-
tures or compounds, or the container, label or the 
shipping case thereof.'' 
Requirements for exemption under this statute are: 
1. The claimant must be ''a person engaged in the 
business of manufacturing or compounding for sale, 
profit or use.'' 
14 
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2. The property on which exemption is claimed 
''enters into and becomes an ingredient or a component 
part of the property'' manufactured. 
It is the contention of the defendant that Barrett 
Investment Company meets neither of these require-
ments. The pla.inliff provides a. service to the public, 
and does not sell a product at all. 
A statute identical or substantially identical to 
59-16-4(h) is to be found in the following states, in addi-
tion to our own : Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming. 
This exemption is thus not unique to our jurisdiction, 
and the courts have often dealt with it. However, not one 
case in any of these jurisdictions has ever sustained, or 
ever seriously considered sustaining, the extension of the 
exemption to services as plaintiff asks this Court to do 
at this time. The cases dealing with this problem are col-
lected in 30 A.L.R. 2d 1439. 
A service and a product are generically different. 
The word "product" in the exemption is usually inter-
preted as meaning only tangible personal property (in 
most jurisdictions this exemption is not extended to 
property which becomes permanently attached to real 
estate as a fixture or component thereof). A service is 
not tangible property, nor even intangible property, but 
a different thing altogether. 
Plaintiff places great reliance here, as in the previous 
section, on the word "use," attempting to give it the 
15 
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same broad, sweeping definition given it in 59-16-4( d). It 
is here inappropriate for exactly the same reasons it wa~ 
there inappropriate. There is no evidence that tlw leg-
islature intended this word to have such a revolutionary 
import and impact in either of these exemption sub-
sections. 
This exemption has been traditionally interpreted 
particularly narrowly, as noted in the A. L. R. summary: 
''In construing use tax provisions exempting from 
the tax materials used in manufacturing, process-
ing or compounding operations for the production 
of tangible personal property, all materials be-
coming components or ingredients of personal 
property resulting from such manufacturing, proc-
essing or compounding operations, courts have 
frequently applied the general rule that tax ex-
emption should be strictly construed against the 
taxpayer." 30 A.L.R. 2d 1442. 
See National Tube Co. v. Glander (1952), 157 Ohio 
St. 407, 105 N.E. 2d 648, and Da.in. Mfg. Co. v. Iowa 
Sta.te Tax Com1nission. (1946), 237 Iowa 531, 22 
N.W. 2d 786. 
CONCLUSION 
The purchases previously described in Category (a) 
are properly subject to Utah use tax, and the deficiency 
assessment thereon should be sustained. Plaintiff has, 
in fact, not argued against the tax on these purchases, 
and thus there is no real controversy in relation thereto. 
The deficiency assessment imposed upon the pur-
chases in Category (b) should also be sustained. These 
properties were used or consumed in Utah within the 
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meaning of Title 59, Chapter 16, U.C.A. 1953, but (as 
Barrett stipulates) there has been no sales or use tax 
paid upon the purchase of these properties by plaintiff. 
The purchase of these properties are not entitled to 
exemption under provisions of 59-16-4(d). The interpre-
tation of this section that plaintiff is urging upon the 
Court is not consistent with the legislative intent behind 
this provision, nor is it consistent with this Court's con-
struction of the section in Union Portland Cement Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 135, 170 P. 2d 164, mod-
ified 110 Utah 176, 176 P. 2d 879. 
Purchases here involved are also not entitled to ex-
emption under provision of 59-16-4(h), U.C.A. 1953. 
Neither this Court nor the court of any state with an iden-
tical or substantially identical exemption has ever given 
approval to the extension of the statute plaintiff urg·es. 
No other provision of Utah law entitles plaintiff 
to exemption, and thus the claim to exemption must fail. 
We, therefore, respectfully urge this Court to affirm the 
decision of the State Tax Commission and uphold the 
deficiency assessment in the amount of $1,548.11 (plus 
interest) against plaintiff, Barrett Investment Company. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
M. REED HUNTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defen.darnt 
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